In The News

Michael Kofman says, "It may require multiple offensives on multiple fronts and will likely be conducted over the period of several months rather than days or weeks."

Michael Kofman says, “The battle for Bakhmut is less important in terms of territory and more in its impact on both forces and what it reveals about them.”

Samuel Bendett says, “Volunteers are still the main source of quadcopters for the Russian forces. It looks like the MoD would like its soldiers to think they can request a quadcopter via official channels, but it’s not clear how many are using such channels.”

Michael Kofman says that the Ukrainians will only have enough weaponry and ammunition, and time, to launch one major offensive this year, using their newly arrived Western supplies and employing thousands of troops trained by the U.S. and UK among others.

Samuel Bendett says, “Russia claims to have a multilayered drone defence in Crimea, with nets, buoys, planes, helicopters, ship-based and shore-based batteries. This is a lot of resources dedicated to catching a small and relatively inexpensive surface vessel.”

Michael Kofman says that retaining the city had helped sustain support from Western countries, proving it was making a difference.

Samuel Bendett says that the use of nets is increasing, though it is not clear how widespread their use is. Ukrainian forces have repurposed fishing nets and chicken-wire fences and built custom metal mesh structures.

Samuel Bendett says,” at least as of this Monday, Ukrainian forces are slowly counterattacking along the flanks around some of the Wagner positions. Some of the Wagner positions are possibly in danger of being encircled.”

Dmitry Gorenburg says, "There's definitely space for improvements.” Taking nuclear weapons and destruction out of the equation, "the Russian submarine threat is the greatest threat that Russia poses to NATO." However, there is now "definitely an appropriate level of awareness of the threat."

Michael Kofman says, “Ukraine seems to be attacking with forces that are unlikely to be related to the main effort. Hence hoping to fix Russian units at Bakhmut and roll back gains over the past few months, while setting the conditions for a major offensive that probably will take place elsewhere.”

Michael Kofman writes, This is not Ukraine’s only remaining opportunity to liberate a substantial amount of territory and inflict a major defeat on Russian forces, but the upcoming offensive may be the moment when available Western military equipment, training, and ammunition best intersect with the forces set aside by Ukraine for this operation.

Michael Kofman says, “Most of the equipment they typically roll through the square was not on display. I think they cut most of the parade short to avoid the risk, and the time during which leadership would be exposed.”

Samuel Bendett says, “The minister of defense cannot afford to have the Wagner forces to leave their position in Bakhmut, to withdraw and essentially hand the Ukrainians a military as well as a public relations victory.”

Michael Kofman says, “Back in January, Russia launched the winter offensive. It was pretty ill-conceived and not well-timed. The Russian forces were not well-positioned to conduct a major set of offensive operations.”

Michael Kofman says that too much was being made of the Kinzhal and that it was not particularly different from other ballistic missiles. The Kinzhal is a variant of Russia’s Iskander-M.

Samuel Bendett says, “There is a need in Ukraine to provide kamikaze quadcopter capability and delivery beyond the technical specifications of these small drones.”