The Role of Space in Russia’s Operations in Ukraine

The Russian military has spent much of the last decade attempting to rebuild the capabilities of its Space Forces (Kosmicheskie voyska Rossii, or KV) after decades of neglect by upgrading and expanding its constellations of satellites and ground-based space infrastructure. The force acquitted itself well during Russian operations in Syria, providing the Russian Air Force and other services with intelligence and targeting data, channels for secure satellite communications (SATCOM), and global position, navigation, and timing (PNT) capabilities. However, the refurbishment of Russia’s military space capabilities was still a work in progress when Russia’s “special military operation” (SVO) in Ukraine started on February 24, 2022. The scale of the operation, which substantially exceeds that of the operation in Syria, has stressed the Russian military’s space and counterspace capabilities beyond their limits.

This paper explores how Russia has employed its space and counterspace capabilities in Ukraine. It begins with an overview of Russian theory and doctrine about the role of space in conflict followed by an assessment of the roles, missions, and functions of Russia’s Space Forces. The paper then provides a detailed analysis of the military’s space‑related capabilities and activities in Ukraine by functional area (reconnaissance, communications, navigation, and counterspace). The paper concludes with an assessment of Russia’s potential future courses of action in the space domain. 

The role of space in war, according to Russian theory and doctrine

Many Russian military thinkers describe space as a nascent theater of military action. Nevertheless, Russian military doctrine recognizes that space is a warfighting domain and that maintaining access to space-based military information, while denying such access to the adversary, is a decisive factor in winning modern wars. Controlling access to space‑based information is seen as conferring enormous advantage in terms of increased situational awareness and enhanced warfighting capability, enabling the side possessing this advantage to conduct effective long-range military operations and cross-domain attacks while leaving the adversary disoriented, disorganized, and vulnerable to defeat. According to the head of the General Staff Academy, Colonel General V. B. Zarudnitsky, the space domain will continue to shift from mostly supporting activities in other domains to hosting active offensive and defensive operations
in its own right:

"All of this [the shift in activities] predetermines the need for proactive elaboration of the theoretical foundations of new forms of warfare in outer space, in particular, antisatellite combat, systemic military operations to destroy state infrastructure facilities, orbital satellite battle, anti-space operations, and others. During these operations, the main efforts will be focused on the disorganization of the enemy control system by destroying the ground infrastructure supporting space forces’ actions and means. According to [Russian] military experts, this is one of the most vulnerable places for the U.S. and NATO. [Stalling their] aggressive intentions is directly related to the decommissioning of systems intelligence, control, and destruction." 

Russian observers claim that the factors driving Russia to develop its space capabilities include actions by the US and others to militarize space, allegedly in contravention of international law; the growing threat of cyberattacks against Russian satellites, especially Russia’s early warning constellation; the evolution and rapid development of counterspace weapons systems; and the growing potential to place weapons in space for use against terrestrial targets.

The time-phasing of space operations is critical in Russian thinking. Space operations—both offensive (counterspace) and defensive—figure prominently during the initial period of war, when both sides are likely to preempt with, in Russian parlance, an “information strike” to disable adversary command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). Russian theory posits that this phase, which marks the transition from threat to armed conflict, will likely be defined by massed aerospace and missile attacks, aerospace defense, and countering operations, along with the beginning of strategic operations in continental (land) and maritime theaters. Russia’s perceptions in this regard are driven by its observations of the US approach to warfare and its actions in conflicts ranging from the Balkans to the Middle East.

To counter such an attack, the Russian General Staff has developed a strategic operational concept, Strategic Aerospace Operations (SVKO). The SVKO consists of “a set of strategic measures and defensive offensive actions to identify and repel an enemy aerospace attack from all directions, to protect the armed forces and economic facilities from strikes by ground, air, and space-based strategic strike forces.” The SVKO is focused primarily on activities in the air domain, although space operations are considered a subset of these efforts. 

According to an article in the Russian Aerospace Forces Academy journal, offensive space operations will precede offensive operations in other domains as well as actions taken to secure Russia’s information space: 

"Space operations will precede air, naval, and land offensive operations and will be directed at gaining supremacy in near-Earth space to ensure the functioning of Russia’s orbital constellations. The main missions of space operations will be to destroy an enemy’s space infrastructure and to disrupt their command and control. Once the supremacy of space information systems and independent military operations is assured in strategic space (meaning offensive missions will predominate to gain the initiative in war), it is then possible to consider defensive operations to defend information resources."