The Central Brain of the Russian Armed Forces

In light of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war and renewed research interest in command and control, military decision-making, and the dynamics of Russian civil-military relations, the Russia Strategic Initiative at US European Command tasked CNA with providing a primer on the Russian General Staff for a public audience. This occasional paper provides a digestible introduction to the Russian General Staff.

The General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is the most central warfighting institution in the Russian Armed Forces, acting both as the planning “brains” of the Russian military and also as the operational-strategic headquarters. Although the administrative, bureaucratic, procurement, logistical, and training functions of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) are massive (as are the research, development, and production roles of the Russian military-industrial complex), the Russian General Staff ultimately plans and executes wartime operations alongside theater and operational direction commanders.

Despite the constant potential for internal bureaucratic tensions within Russia’s sprawling military institutions, the Russian General Staff has safeguarded its role as an intellectual hub and as the key war-planning, war-executing, and operational-strategic decision-making body in the ecosystem of major institutions that make up the Russian military. It has successfully defended its prerogatives to plan and execute war-making on behalf of the minister of defense and his principal in the Kremlin against bureaucratic infighting and is tightly integrated with both the regional military districts and wartime theater and operational commands.

Furthermore, the General Staff has thrived under its longtime leader, Chief of the General Staff (CGS) Valeriy Gerasimov, despite challenges both before and after the onset of the Russia-Ukraine war. It is also well positioned to remain the key decision-influencing, war-planning, and operational-strategic locus of energy within the Russian Armed Forces for the foreseeable future—despite the fact that former defense minister Sergei Shoigu (Gerasimov’s longtime ally) has been removed from his position.

The longevity of CGS Gerasimov, who has been serving since 2012, has helped maintain the General Staff’s position within the military-bureaucratic hierarchy and has likely furthered centralization dynamics. Whether the General Staff may be reformed or decision-making shifted to Joint Strategic Commands, theater commander, or other parts of the MOD upon Gerasimov’s retirement remains an open question.