Search Results

Your search for Jonathan Schroden found 33 results.

Independent Assessment of US Government Efforts against Al Qaeda

/reports/2017/independent-assessment-of-us-government-efforts-against-al-qaeda

Section 1228 of the 2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) states, “The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, shall provide for the conduct of an independent assessment of the effectiveness of the United States’ efforts to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al- Qaeda, including its affiliated groups, associated groups, and adherents since September 11, 2001.” The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (ASD (SO/LIC)) asked CNA to conduct this independent assessment, the results of which are presented in this report.

bound our assessment approach. A list of specific scoping caveats can be found in the body of this report. Julia McQuaid Jonathan Schroden /reports/2017/drm-2017-u-015710-2rev.pdf

Future Policy Options for US Efforts Against Al Qaeda

/reports/2017/future-policy-options-for-us-efforts-against-al-qaeda

In its independent assessment of U.S. government efforts against Al-Qaeda that was mandated by Congress via the 2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), CNA concluded that the current U.S. strategy toward Al-Qaeda was unlikely to achieve its stated goals to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat the group. CNA recommended that the U.S. government should undertake a new review of its policy goals and overarching strategy against Al-Qaeda. This occasional paper presents three potential policy options for the U.S. government to consider, should it seek to undertake such a review. These options are retrenchment, escalation, and containment.

as to the way ahead. Jonathan Schroden Julia McQuaid /reports/2017/dop-2017-u-016307-1rev.pdf /reports/2017/dop-2017-u-016307-1rev_Page_01.jpg /reports/2017/al%20qaeda%20chart.jpg Countering Threats

Asking the Right Questions A Framework for Assessing Counterterrorism Actions

/reports/2016/asking-the-right-questions-a-framework-for-assessing-counterterrorism-actions

Since the attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States has dedicated an extraordinary amount of time, money, and effort to countering terrorism, using a variety of approaches and tools. However, it has devoted comparatively little effort to developing rigorous and useful assessment frameworks to help policymakers and practitioners understand how effective these counterterrorism (CT) actions have been. To address this shortfall, in this paper we first identify and characterize today’s prevailing theories of terrorism and their associated CT actions. For each theory, we then create an assessment framework—consisting of specific questions that need to be answered in order to gauge the success or failure of CT actions, and indicators that could be used to answer those questions. These assessment frameworks—which rigorously link policy to practice—should enable CT practitioners to provide policymakers and commanders direct and actionable feedback on whether the approaches they have chosen to countering terrorist groups are having the impacts they expect and desire.

. To our knowledge, this is the first time such a comprehensive mapping of terrorism theories to CT indicators has been performed. Jonathan Schroden William Rosenau /reports/2016/drm-2015-u-012261-final

Were the Afghan National Security Forces Successful

/reports/2014/were-the-afghan-national-security-forces-successful

With all of the recent developments pertaining to a possible bilateral security agreement (BSA) regarding future troop presence and military cooperation between the United States and Afghanistan, another important aspect of the future of Afghanistan has gotten much less attention. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) just finished their first year of being fully in the lead for providing security in Afghanistan, with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in support. With 2013 behind us, it is time to take stock of how the ANSF performed.

. These empirical, independent observations, when taken together, show that the ANSF were generally successful in 2013 and performed better than most people realize. Jonathan Schroden Patricio

Are We Winning

/reports/2014/are-we-winning

In more than a decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States’ armed forces have encountered myriad challenges in their efforts to execute simultaneous counterinsurgency campaigns. Assessing progress on the ground—what we will refer to here as “operations assessment”—has proven an especially challenging task. For CNA analysts, as well as uniformed operations research and systems analysis (ORSA) personnel, the operations assessment process has grown in importance and consumed increasing analytic resources over the course of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). While there have been new and innovative approaches to operations assessment in recent years, there has also been a great deal of relearning old lessons from previous eras (under different conditions). This relearning is, at least in part, attributable to the lack of a comprehensive history of operations assessment.

exists to re-examine and redesign effective means of assessing progress in future operations. Emily Mushen Jonathan Schroden /reports/2014/dop-2014-u-008512-1rev%20%281%29.pdf

Special Operations Research Program

/centers-and-divisions/cna/special-programs/special-operations

Brings a deep and regional understanding of operations to issues facing special ops forces, including exercises, workforce, security and infrastructure.

? Dr. Jonathan Schroden explains why special operations forces are uniquely suited to difficult policy problems requiring unorthodox solutions. The answer lies in the consideration of risk. small ... Schroden testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee’s Hearing on the of Role of Special Operations Forces in Competing with China and Russia

coming in from the cold: The Mujahideen: From Allies To Menace

/our-media/podcasts/coming-in-from-the-cold/22

This month on Coming in From the Cold, a discussion of the history of Afghanistan leading up to the Soviet Invasion, and the legacy of the war in the modern-day nation. Regular guest Steve Wills sits in for Bill Rosenau as host and is joined by Ohio University professor of history Dr. John Brobst, and Dr. Jon Schroden Director of CNA's Center for Stability and Development.

22 This month on Coming in From the Cold, a discussion of the history of Afghanistan leading up to the Soviet Invasion, and the legacy of the war in the modern-day nation. Regular guest Steve Wills sits in for Bill Rosenau as host and is joined by Ohio University professor of history Dr. John Brobst, and Dr. Jon Schroden Director of CNA's Center for Stability and Development. The Mujahideen: From Allies To Menace Biographies Dr. Jonathan Schroden is the Director of CNA's Center for Stability and Development (CSD), and also directs CNA's Special Operations Program, which focuses

Implications of IUUF for SpecOpsForces

/reports/2023/10/implications-of-iuuf-for-specopsforces

US special operations forces could help counter China’s IUU fishing violations as a “global connector,” sharing information and training partner nations.

still be useful to other US government agencies involved in countering IUU fishing. Jonathan Schroden Cornell Overfield /reports/2023/10/Implications-IUUF-for-SpecOpsForces.pdf /reports/2023/10

Next Generation Leadership and Implications SOF

/reports/2022/08/next-generation-leadership-and-implications-sof

Special operations forces need leadership suited to Millennials and Gen Zers. This study recommends a leadership philosophy, leadership traits, and accountability.

leadership on the future battlefield. We examined these sources in the context of the “paradoxical trinity of leadership”, which connects leadership traits across leaders, followers, and context. Jonathan Schroden Elizabeth S. Lee /reports/2022/08/Next%20Gen%20Leadership.pdf /reports/2022/08/Next-Gen-Leadership-Implications-SpForces.jpg /reports/2022/08

Why Special Operations

/reports/2020/09/why-special-operations

There is today a burgeoning discussion in the literature as to what really constitutes a “special operation,” what makes the forces that conduct them “special,” whether these aspects are so different from conventional military operations and forces as to warrant their own theory, and, if they do, what such a theory should be. This paper addresses an aspect of special operations that has yet to be explained adequately—the question of why special operations are conducted. The answer lies in the consideration of risk. Because policy-makers are inherently reliant upon some form of popular support to maintain their positions of power, they are also inherently averse to taking risky actions. The centrality of risk to policy decisions leads directly to this definition: special operations are unorthodox military solutions to difficult policy problems that lower the level of risk to policy-makers. This definition leads to a risk-centric theory of why special operations are conducted: if policy-makers have a difficult policy problem and they are unsatisfied with the level of risk presented by orthodox solutions or inaction, then they will choose special operations. After deriving this theory, this paper evaluates it, applies it to the raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan, and discusses implications of the theory for the future of US special operations forces.

to policy decisions leads directly to this definition: Special operations are unorthodox military  solutions to difficult policy problems that lower the level of risk to policy-makers. Jonathan Schroden /reports/2020/09/COP-2020-U-028160-Final.pdf /reports/2020/09/COP-2020-U-028160-Final.png /reports/2020/09/Why%20SpecOps.png Countering Threats and Challenges /centers-and-divisions/cna/sppp