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Your search for Megan McBride found 39 results.

DOD Continuums of Harm

/reports/2021/11/dod-continuums-of-harm

Throughout its history of confronting sexual assault and racial extremism, the Department of Defense has described the perpetrators as “a few bad apples.”

on the individuals engaged in the activities. Zack Gold Megan K. McBride /reports/2021/11/DOD-Continuums-of-Harm.pdf /reports/2021/11/DOD-Continuums-of-Harm.PNG /images/GenericReportImage.jpg Countering Threats

Racial Extremism in the Military

/reports/2021/11/racial-extremism-in-the-military

Before and after January 6, 2021, a series of reports called attention to the potential threat posed by extremists in the military.

that are relevant to the problem of racial extremism and could provide a foundation on which to identify both helpful and unhelpful ways of approaching this issue. Megan K. McBride Zack Gold /reports/2021/11

USMC Twitter Activity Relating to 2021 Extremism

/reports/2021/10/usmc-twitter-activity-relating-to-2021-extremism

This short paper captures the results of a recent proof-of-concept analysis that CNA conducted to assess activity within the USMC community that mentioned the issue of extremism. This particular case was tightly focused, however, this type of analysis can easily be scoped to answer a range of important questions. It can center on a community, topic, geographic region, or timeframe. It can be used narrowly to assess how a specific policy is being received (as in the case study outlined below) or broadly to assess the health of an online community (e.g., identifying sources of disinformation). Additionally, while the case below focuses on Twitter, analysis can be conducted on data from a range of social media platforms. The case described below was designed to illustrate the type of analysis that is possible and to demonstrate the value that it can provide to those active on social media.

linked to extremism. Dr. Megan K. McBride Mr. Rikesh Nana /reports/2021/10/CNA-Case-Study-USMC-Twitter-Activity-Relating-to-the-2021-Extremism-Stand-Down.pdf /reports/2021/10/USMC.jpg /images

The Psychology of Disinformation Case Studies

/reports/2021/10/the-psychology-of-disinformation-case-studies

The absorption and spread of disinformation is a pervasive phenomenon across a wide variety of topics and media. Most disinformation research focuses on the source (who created it?) and the environment in which it exists (what platform/medium transmits the information?). Recognizing that disinformation primarily works in an individual person’s mind, this report describes four normal, routine psychological mechanisms that are associated with the absorption and spread of disinformation. We then describe real-world case studies—focusing on activities linked to COVID-19, and to campaigns coordinated by US adversaries including Russia, China, and Iran—to illustrate the way these mechanisms can be manipulated to aid the spread disinformation. The report concludes with multi-pronged recommendations that DOD can use to address the vulnerabilities associated with these psychological mechanisms so as prevent the spread of disinformation and protect both US servicemembers and the country.

, it  appears that disinformation is absorbed and spread through normal, routine, and adaptive mechanisms, which malign actors can exploit and manipulate for their own objectives. Megan McBride

Psychology of Disinformation Key Psychological Mechanisms

/reports/2021/10/psychology-of-disinformation-key-psychological-mechanisms

We explore the underlying psychological principles facilitating the absorption and spread of disinformation and outline options for countering disinformation grounded in in cognitive and social psychological literature.

Countering Threats and Challenges DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release: distribution unlimited. 72 DRM-2021-U-029337-1Rev Neil Carey Megan K. McBride

Right Wing Extremism in US Law Enforcement

/reports/2021/04/right-wing-extremism-in-us-law-enforcement

This paper provides an overview of the current state of knowledge about police officer engagement in rightwing extremism, including the sustained use of racist, misogynistic, and homophobic language and stereotyping, both online and offline. After surveying the contemporary right-wing extremist landscape, this paper uses publicly available sources to explore in a preliminary way aspects of extremist penetration and recruitment, pre-employment screening challenges, police participation in extremist activity, and the role of social media platforms and the internet in enabling extremism. The paper concludes with a set of analytical questions that practitioners and policy-makers must answer if they hope to mitigate the rightwing extremist threat.

extremist threat.  William Rosenau Megan McBride /reports/2021/04/what-we-know-and-what-we-dont-know-about-the-presence-of-right-wing-extremism-in-law-enforcement.pdf /reports/2021/04

Understanding Gender and Violent

/reports/2021/04/understanding-gender-and-violent

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict – Stability and Humanitarian Affairs (OASD (SO/LIC-SHA)) asked CNA to study the role of women and gender in both violent extremist organizations (VEOs) and US counterterrorism (CT) and counter violent extremism (CVE) operations (hereafter CT/CVE). Our research demonstrates that the dominant stereotypes about women’s roles in VEOs miss the vast majority of female activity in these groups and fundamentally fail to capture women’s lived experiences. Despite the passage of Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) legislation in the US, we found that internal DOD activities that are truly gender considered are severely limited, lack nuance, and are not institutionalized. External US CT/CVE efforts do not consider the roles men or women play from a nuanced perspective, and they are disproportionately influenced by a set of gender stereotypes that shape expectations of men and women’s roles. Much of the current DOD approach can be traced to misunderstanding gender as a concept. This report provides an analysis of the gaps, risks, and opportunities for the Department of Defense (DOD) on understanding women and gender in extremism, and integrating a gender considered approach to CT/CVE.

, or activities. Pamela G. Faber Megan K. McBride /reports/2021/04/Understanding-Gender-and-Violent-Extremism.pdf /reports/2021/04/Understanding-Gender-and-Violent-Extremism.PNG /reports/2021/04

Viral Extremism COVID19 and Nontraditional Threats

/reports/2021/03/viral-extremism-covid19-and-nontraditional-threats

This policy brief, developed in collaboration with counterterrorism (CT) experts at CNA, seeks to answer the question of how the COVID-19 pandemic has affected domestic and international violent extremist organizations (VEOs), the US CT community, and the ability of US partners to support CT operations. Importantly, it provides a snapshot of how pandemics and other nontraditional threats can drive a cycle of violence in the future. This brief concludes that nearly every facet of VEO activities—environment, operations, resources, recruitment, and strategy—has benefitted from the chaotic and widespread effects of the pandemic. Conversely, US and partner forces tasked with containing the threat posed by terrorist groups have been affected negatively across these same five areas.

political unrest, including the January 6, 2021, storming of the US Capitol, has drawn attention to domestic security issues. Pamela G. Faber Megan K. McBride /reports/2021/03/IOP-2021-U-029346-Final.pdf

Social Media Bots: Laws

/reports/2020/09/social-media-bots-laws

While social media bots have the ability to greatly affect US national security and public discourse, the current landscape of US federal and state laws regulating such bots is limited. This study explores the challenges inherent to passing social media bot-related legislation and details current efforts to do so, including at the federal and state levels. It briefly explores the context in the European Union as well. This paper then discusses the dilemmas social media companies face as they think about effective bot policies and identifies the four main categories of policies through which the social media platforms regulate the use of bots on their sites. As they face evolving threats from bots, the social media companies will continue to adapt their policies accordingly, though it remains an open question whether and to what extent these companies should regulate themselves in the face of additional pressure from Congress and the public.

on these issues. Kasey Stricklin Megan K McBride /reports/2020/10/DIM-2020-U-028193-Final.pdf /reports/2020/10/DIM-2020-U-028193-Final.png /reports/2020/10/jack%20dorsey.png Countering Threats

Implication of Social Media Bots

/reports/2020/09/implication-of-social-media-bots

CNA initiated this study of social media bots—automated programs on social media platforms—to explore their implications for US special operations forces (SOF) and the broader national security community. This report explains social media bots and botnets, explores the threat of automation and the role of social media bots as a tool of disinformation, and introduces a taxonomy of six activities that social media bots and botnets can engage in: distributing, amplifying, distorting, hijacking, flooding, and fracturing. It then identifies likely evolutions in the nearto mid-term futures and explores the implications of those futures for SOF. The report examines opportunities and risks for SOF and concludes with examples of potential SOF use in each of the six identified social media bot and botnet activities.

by humans but could have been conducted by social media bots or botnets. Megan K. McBride Zack Gold /reports/2020/09/DRM-2020-U-028199-Final.pdf /reports/2020/09/DRM-2020-U-028199-Final.png