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Your search for Peter Swartz found 45 results.

Making-Captains-of-War-CNOS-Studies-Group-1981-1995

/reports/2016/making-captains-of-war-cnos-studies-group-1981-1995

The Strategic Studies Group, created by the Chief of Naval Operations in 1981 to prepare Navy officers to think strategically, succeeded, this review finds.

future three- and four-star officers and promoting strategic debate, to delivering tangible products to the CNO. John T. Hanley Peter M. Swartz

The-Impact-of-the-CNOs-Strategic-Studies-Group-1981-1995

/reports/2016/the-impact-of-the-cnos-strategic-studies-group-1981-1995

Condensed version of Making Captains of War summarizes the impact of the Chief of Naval Operations’ Strategic Studies Group in its first 15 years from 1981.

start with a bang, as it will set a precedent for its future success. Christopher Steinitz Peter M. Swartz /reports/2016/Impact-of-the-CNOs-Strategic-Studies-Group-1981-1995.pdf

Navy Capstone Strategies A Brief Summary

/reports/2011/navy-capstone-strategies-a-brief-summary

This briefing focuses on a brief summary U.S. Navy capstone strategies and concepts (1970-2010)

Operations Concept (NOC) May 2010 NDP 1: Naval Warfare Aug 2010 Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 13 Oct 2010 Peter M. Swartz Karin Duggan /reports/2011/d0026437.a1.pdf /reports/2011/d0026437.a1

The Navy At A Tipping Point

/reports/2010/the-navy-at-a-tipping-point

For the past 60 years, since roughly the outbreak of the Korean War and the U.S. response to that war, the Navy has had a consistent strategy for the structure, deployment, and posturing of the fleet. American maritime dominance has been based on forces that were deployed forward and always ready to respond quickly to emerging situations in areas of vital interest to American foreign policy. Because of the perceived need to be able to respond at the highest levels of warfare throughout the Cold War, those forces were built, trained, and equipped to be “combat credible” against capable challengers. “Combat credible” meant the ability to project power against advanced air defenses, conduct and enable littoral/amphibious operations in opposed environments, and establish blue-water dominance against highly capable surface, sub-surface, and air threats.

UNLIMITED. 50 CAB D0022262.A3 Neil Jenkins Peter Swartz

Organizing OPNAV 1970 to 2009

/reports/2010/organizing-opnav-1970-to-2009

The Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC) is committed to providing all U.S. Navy personnel, especially decision makers, their staffs, and the faculty and students of its educational institutions with a deeper understanding of their past. Such an understanding enables the making of more sophisticated and nuanced Navy policy decisions in the present and future. To this end, NHHC is embarking on a study of the origins and development of the position of Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and his staff (OPNAV), to provide needed perspective and context for current arid future incumbents in that position and office. Completion of this study is timed to coincide with the upcoming 100th anniversary of the 1915 creation of the position of CNO by President Woodrow Wilson. It is intended to expand upon and update the existing literature on the subject, which is becoming outdated, especially Dr. Thomas Hone's excellent "Power and Change: The Administrative History of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1946-1986" published in 1989 by the Naval Historical Center (NHHC's predecessor organization).

,” later “program appraisal”), should read the sections for each decade on the appropriate issue area, in sequence. Peter M. Swartz Michael C. Markowitz /reports/2010/D0020997.A5.pdf

US Navy Capstone Strategy What to Do

/reports/2009/us-navy-capstone-strategy-what-to-do

This paper provides a detailed set of recommendations intended to be useful to Navy decision-makers and staff officers charged with developing the current and next generations of US Navy capstone documents. It is part of a larger study of the drafting and influence of all US Navy capstone documents since 1970.

areas, would risk discrediting the capstone document in which the declaration was made – and therefore the Navy as a whole. Peter Swartz /reports/2009/d0020071.a1.pdf /reports/2009/d0020071.a1

Renewal of Navys Riverine Capability A Preliminary Examination

/reports/2006/renewal-of-navys-riverine-capability-a-preliminary-examination

The Director of Deep Blue (OPNAV N3/5) asked the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) to help the Navy define the maritime domain in which riverine operations may take place, the potential missions and tasks appropriate for a riverine force, and the resource implications related to the Navy’s decision to establish a riverine capability. This report examines riverine history; defines the maritime domain as it applies to brown-water operations, identifies where riverine operations might occur; and identifies operational and functional tasks that might be employed by a riverine force. It also examines how well the U.S. Navy’s projected riverine capability fits across a range of military operations. We found that the U.S. Navy has a long and varied but episodic history of riverine operations, which are inherently joint and often combined. Ground and air combat units along with different types of naval units routinely work together. While riverine craft are usually the centerpiece of any riverine operation, they do not perform significant riverine missions by themselves. Riverine operations are also complex: they involve frequent close combat and the employment of combined arms.

/strategy-and-policy-analysis APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED. 190 CRM D0013241.A5 Peter Swartz Scott Savitz Dan Stimpson

Political Military Trends in Italy Greece and Spain

/reports/2005/political-military-trends-in-italy-greece-and-spain

These studies of the current geo-political climates in Greece, Italy, and Spain provide an important backdrop to a number of questions relevant to the study of U.S. Navy-host nation cooperation on AT-FP policies. That cooperation takes place within a context shaped by the host nations' security concerns and national politics and the developing security issues of the region. In addition, the overall atmosphere of US-European and US-host nation relations shape the extent to which the U.S. Navy can work with the host nation to craft an effective AT-FP policy for Navy shore establishments. If we are to provide realistic and useful conclusions and recommendation for the Navy's way ahead on this issue, then they must be grounded on a realistic and useful reading of the current state of political and military cooperation, as well as an accurate assessment of differing security interests and areas of possible friction in the future.

on the principles outlined below. Ian Lesser Peter M. Swartz /reports/2005/CIM%20D0012974.A2.pdf /reports/2005/CIM%20D0012974.A2_Page_01.jpg /images/GenericReportImage.jpg Strategy and Policy Analysis

North American Maritime Homeland Security

/reports/2004/north-american-maritime-homeland-security

The CNA Corporation (CNAC) has been involved in this issue since well before the attacks of September 11th, 2001, and has provided direct support to the Global War On Terror, both overseas and domestically since the attacks. Additionally, CNAC has provided support to U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) planning and programming in recent years.

to be done on their maritime aspects. Peter Swartz Joel J. Sokolsky Joseph F. Bouchard Alarik M. Fritz James M. Wylie /reports/2004/CIM%20D0009767.A3.pdf /reports/2004/CIM%20D0009767.A3_Page_01.jpg

US Greek Naval Relations Begin

/reports/2003/us-greek-naval-relations-begin

This paper discusses the U.S. Navy’s campaign against Greek pirates who interfered with American shipping in the Aegean during the second decade of the nineteenth century. This campaign was not a particularly important one in the overall history of the U.S. Navy, nor did it strongly influence subsequent Greek-American naval relations. Nevertheless, it illustrates some key aspects of the nature of the Greek war for independence, and of the republic in North America that had itself won its independence less than half a century earlier.

against piracy in the Caribbean. In 1820, the brig Spark became the first American warship to visit Smyrna. Peter M. Swartz /reports/2003/COP%20D0008571.A1.pdf /reports/2003/COP%20D0008571.A1_Page_1.jpg