Earlier this year, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) announced the most significant national-level organizational changes to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in nearly a decade. These organizational changes resulted in the creation of a new PLA Information Support Force responsible for the development and application of network information systems for use in modern warfare. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary and Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman Xi Jinping hailed the creation of the new force as a development of “great and far-reaching significance” for the PLA. The creation of the new PLA Information Support Force has attracted widespread attention. Though the reasons for its creation are unclear and open to debate, it is important for US national security professionals to understand the significance of this new organization and its potential implications for US interests.
The restructuring announced by the PRC Ministry of National Defense established a new system of PLA services (军种) and arms (兵种) under the leadership of the CMC. While the four services remained unchanged—the PLA’s Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force—a ministry spokesperson announced the creation of three new arms to serve alongside the existing Joint Logistics Support Force. These new arms are the Aerospace Force, Cyberspace Force, and Information Support Force. The new service structure is illustrated in the figure below.
A key casualty of the reform was the PLA’s Strategic Support Force, which was dissolved in the reorganization despite having been established with much fanfare just nine years prior. Although two of the new units—the Aerospace and Cyberspace Forces—were spun off from the Strategic Support Force, the Information Support Force appears to be an entirely new organization focused on the development and application of network information systems for use in modern warfare. Xi Jinping has described the new force as shouldering a “heavy responsibility” in promoting the high-quality development of China’s military and prevailing in future military contingencies.
Why did China create the Information Support Force?
Beijing has yet to publicly comment on the rationale behind the decisions to establish the Information Support Force and dissolve the Strategic Support Force, but there are several plausible explanations. One is the growing importance of information systems to the PLA. Enhancing information support capabilities has become a crucial endeavor for the PLA to achieve Xi’s vision of creating an “informatized” military and laying the groundwork for an “intelligentized” force. In his report to the 20th CCP Congress in 2022, Xi called for the establishment of a “strong system of strategic deterrence” based on accelerating the development of unmanned, intelligent combat capabilities and promoting the coordinated development and application of the network information systems. A commentary on the founding of the Information Support Force published in the PLA’s official newspaper, PLA Daily, referenced Xi’s remarks to the 20th CCP Congress on this subject and stated that the Information Support Force would play a key supporting role in meeting those goals.
Another possible explanation concerns the PLA’s own assessments that more work needs to be done to improve its information systems. China’s 2019 Defense White Paper, for example, highlighted the “urgent need” to enhance the level of “informatization” within the force. A PLA senior colonel recently cited persistent problems for the PLA, such as incompatible software and hardware across different services and the limited information sharing between units. He contended that the new Information Support Force would be charged with addressing these issues and “ensuring information superiority.”
The PLA’s efforts towards enhancing information systems may also reflect a desire to keep pace with the advancement of US military capabilities. With no military combat experience since the late 1970s, the PLA must study the operations of foreign militaries to understand the implications of advanced technologies and global trends on modern warfare. Developments pertaining to the US military are closely scrutinized by PRC military observers, particularly advances in US military information support systems. For example, China has demonstrated sustained interest in the US military’s Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) initiative, which involves integrating battlefield situation awareness data across domains, achieving integrated command and control capabilities across services, and preparing for future operational environments. One PRC journal article described JADC2 as the US military’s “perfect development blueprint” for “informationized” and “intelligentized” warfare. The establishment of the Information Support Force may reflect the PLA’s desire to stay current in the increasing competition in information networks among major powers.
Russia’s inadequate performance in the Ukraine War may also have highlighted to Chinese military planners the dangers of insufficient information support on the battlefield. PRC military observers have written at length on the conflict in Ukraine, particularly the implications for the PLA regarding how the war has been fought. One topic closely scrutinized in PRC military publications has been the failure of the Russian military to secure its own communications, which allowed Ukrainian forces to intercept them and inflict heavy losses, including the deaths of several senior Russian commanders. A January 2023 article in the PLA Daily highlighted pervasive “shortcomings and weaknesses” in the information-based combat capabilities of the Russian military causing the force to resort to the “traditional tactics of mechanized warfare.”
Finally, the reorganization may reflect problems with the disbanded Strategic Support Force. Two of the force’s former leaders—General Ju Qiansheng and Lieutenant General Shang Hong—have not appeared in PRC media since the Strategic Support Force was dissolved. This could indicate that they have been caught up in the recent corruption investigations of high-ranking PLA officers. The recent expulsion from the CCP of former PRC Minister of Defense Li Shangfu—who previously served as the Strategic Support Force chief of staff—for unspecified breaches of discipline also hints at systemic problems within the highest levels of the organization. Additionally, press reporting suggests that the Strategic Support Force may have had a role in the high-altitude surveillance balloon that flew over US airspace in early 2023 before being shot down by the US military, which was a publicly embarrassing development for Beijing. These issues may have combined to accelerate the demise of the Strategic Support Force and given rise to the creation of the new Information Support Force.
Why should US national security professionals be concerned about the Information Support Force?
The priority accorded to information systems by PRC military planners suggests that Beijing understands their growing importance to future warfare and hopes to leverage them to achieve an operational advantage over potential adversaries. The Information Support Force appears likely to lead these efforts, and it is crucial for US national security professionals to understand the roles, missions, and capabilities of this new force and its implications for future PLA combat operations.
