Improving Lethal Action: Learning and Adapting in U.S.Counterterrorism Operations

The United States uses lethal force to kill individuals it believes pose an imminent terrorist threat to its citizens and interests, as well as those of its allies and partners. This lethal force is often, though not always, successful in killing the individuals being targeted. But it can also kill civilians it did not intend to target. In addition to the human tragedy of these unintended deaths, operations that cause civilian casualties reduce the overall effectiveness of the U.S. counterterrorism (CT) effort by:

• alienating local populations (thereby reducing their willingness to provide
  intelligence and creating grievances that can lead to the creation of more
  terrorists);
• failing to disrupt the threat (if the action did not kill the intended individuals);
• delegitimizing U.S. counterterrorism efforts in the eyes of directly and
  indirectly affected foreign populations; and 
• creating political difficulties with our allies and partners.

Given the real potential of negative outcomes from the use of lethal force to undermine U.S. counterterrorism efforts and objectives, it would seem prudent for the U.S. government to have in place an effective operations analysis framework and lessons-learned process to ensure that it is learning and adapting its counterterrorism operations for maximum success. Yet, at least publically, this appears to not be the case. The lack of such a process is compounded by the fact that both the conduct and oversight of these operations are divided among different organizations, making cohesive learning even more difficult. As such, the present report seeks to address this deficiency by presenting an analytic framework and lessons-learned process that the U.S. government could—and should—use to continually and comprehensively improve the effectiveness of its lethal force operations and reduce the likelihood of civilian casualties in the future.

Learning from Past Counterterrorism Operations 

The analytic framework contains three elements:

• Context. The context element involves determining the scope of mission success, as well as negative effects, during operations, including a “report card” to demonstrate the extent that operations met U.S. objectives for lethal action.
• Causes. This element involves reconstructing individual incidents of interest, identifying specific factors leading to undesired effects, and aggregating these factors to understand the reasons that operations sometimes fail to meet stated objectives.
• Conduct. This element takes the observed causes and develops tailored changes to guidance and operational approaches in order to promote mission success in future operations.

Overall, this approach provides insight into current and past operations. It also informs guidance and operational approaches so that military planners can adapt future operations to avoid the kind of operational deficiencies that have hampered mission success in the past. This approach can help ensure counterterrorism operations better meet the U.S. government’s intent in general, and promote success overall in the future conduct of U.S. counterterrorism operations. A review of CT operations based on the approach detailed herein would be most effective as an officially sponsored U.S. effort conducted by an independent team with full access to
operational data. 

Report Card for Lethal Action Operations

Examples from real world operations help to demonstrate what this framework and lessons-learned process look like in practice, and what kinds of results and insights they can produce. For example, the context element includes a “report card” view of whether key U.S. objectives are being met during operations. Using available data for U.S. operations in Pakistan and Yemen, it appears that the two aims of recent Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG)—mission success and reducing civilian casualties—are not being met in full for those operations. 

For years where both key U.S. aims were met— specifically, the measures for mission success and civilian casualties improved or did not change for the worse compared to the previous year—the year is color-coded green. Where neither aim was met, the year is color-coded red. When one was met but not the other, the year is color-coded yellow. Hence, mission success against senior terrorist leaders  consistently decreased in Yemen from 2012 through 2014, and also decreased in Pakistan in 2014. Civilian casualty rates decreased for
Pakistan in 2013 and 2014, but Yemen shows an increasing rate of civilian casualties in these same years. There was only one year in one theater—2013 in Pakistan—that showed improvement in both aims of the PPG. It is important to note that the report card entries use open source data; the process should be repeated with operational data as part of the official, independent review recommended in this report. Overall, this report card points out areas where improvements in current counterterrorism operations are possible. This report card approach could also be adapted for the use of lethal force in other theaters, such as Iraq and Syria. 

Expected Benefits

Importantly, the approach proposed here does not stop with identifying where operations did not meet the full intent of existing guidance such as the PPG. Rather, the analytic approach continues with identification of root causes and follow-on analysis to identify concrete ways that guidance and operational approaches could be modified to better meet U.S. objectives in CT operations. Expected benefits from such analysis for lethal operations include:

• refinements to policy and guidance (including a modified PPG if appropriate);
• alternative tactics and operational approaches to improve mission success and reduce civilian casualties, given observed root causes;
• cross-pollination of best practices across organizations;
• Highlighting deficiencies in current capabilities and the impact of these deficiencies; 
• a discussion of how to adapt to adversary approaches that complicate lethal action and targeting criteria; and 
• a basis for informed policy decisions regarding organizational responsibilities in future lethal action operations.

This approach would also have several other benefits, including:

• helping to separate fact from opinion on key issues concerning the use of lethal force; 
• acting as a means of improving unity of effort among the different elements of execution and oversight of lethal action across U.S. departments and agencies; 
• providing an exemplar for broader changes in the U.S. military in light of  identified lessons and an increasing requirement for minimizing civilian casualties—which is especially important considering the possibility of ending the current Authorization of Use of Military Force (AUMF); 
• enhancing the perceived legitimacy of U.S. lethal action campaigns by better aligning policy and practice; and 
• serving as a precedent and model for other countries regarding the responsible use of lethal force, particularly as they acquire new technologies such as armed drones.

Precedent for a U.S. Review

The approach outlined here is possible—because it has been done before. In Afghanistan, the elements in this analytical framework were employed, resulting in measures that improved both mission success and reduced civilian casualties. However, this effort was taken only after years of lessons not being effectively learned. The U.S. counterterrorism lethal action program would benefit from a similar framework and process. Such an effort would help fulfill U.S. commitments to effectively protect its citizens against imminent threats while doing everything possible to minimize civilian harm as a result of its operations.