CHAPTER
7
Socioeconomic Status in Perspective |
|||||||||||||||||||
|
Imbalances in
socioeconomic representation in the military often have been a controversial
social and political issue. [1] In debate over the establishment of the volunteer force, opponents
argued that it would lead to a military composed of those from poor
and minority backgrounds, forced to turn to the military as an employer
of last resort. Some critics anticipated that the consequences would
be not only inequitable, but dangerous. They argued that by recruiting
primarily from an underclass, the volunteer force would create a serious
cleavage between the military and the rest of society. [2]
The belief that
the enlisted military drew recruits primarily from lower socioeconomic
groups was a major element in proposals for either a return to conscription
or some form of national service program that would draw all classes
into military or civilian service. The philosophical basis for these
proposals was the conviction that all social classes should contribute
their share to the national defense. A 1988 report by the Democratic
Leadership Council stated, We cannot ask the poor and under-privileged
alone to defend us while our more fortunate sons and daughters take
a free ride, forging ahead with their education and careers.
[3] Many of the assertions
about the class composition of the military have been based on impressions
and anecdotes rather than on empirical data. Analysis of Vietnam
era veterans indicated that individuals of high socioeconomic status
comprised about half the proportion of draftees compared to their
representation in the overall population. [4] Three systematic analyses of
the socioeconomic composition of accessions during the volunteer period
suggest that little has changed with the All Volunteer Force. All
found that members of the military tended to come from backgrounds
that were somewhat lower in socioeconomic status than the U.S. average,
but that the differences between the military and the comparison groups
were relatively modest. [5] These results have been confirmed in recent
editions of this report, which portray a socioeconomic composition
of enlisted accessions similar to the population as a whole, but with
the top quartile of the population underrepresented. [6] While the socioeconomic status of recruits
is slightly lower than the general population, todays recruits have
higher levels of education, measured aptitudes, and reading skills
than their civilian counterparts. Operations Desert
Shield and Desert Storm revived concerns that Blacks would bear a
disproportionate share of fighting and dying in future wars. The
Chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services stated, The
Committee
spent some considerable time on this [issue] and came to a rather
surprising conclusion about it. Its not true." [7] A related report concluded that the volunteer system provided
quality enlistees; that minorities would not bear a much heavier burden
of combat; and that a draft would neither be as fair nor produce a
force as high in quality as the current system.
[8] The report indicated that a draft would lead to a less educated,
less motivated, and less competent force, even though it might be
more representative of the upper and lower social strata. [1] See,
for example, Cooper, R.V.L., Military Manpower and the All-Volunteer
Force (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1977). [2] See, for example, Janowitz, M., The All Volunteer Military
as a Socio-Political Problem, Social Problems (February 1975),
pp. 432449. [3] Democratic Leadership Council, Citizenship and National Service:
A Blueprint for Civic Enterprise (Washington, DC: Author, May 1988),
p. 25. [4] Boulanger, G., Who Goes to War? in A. Egendorf, C. Kadushin,
R.S. Laufer, G. Rothbart, and L. Sloan (Eds.), Legacies of Vietnam:
Comparative Adjustment of Veterans and Their Peers, Vol. 4. Long-term
Stress Reactions: Some Causes, Consequences, and Naturally Occurring
Support Systems (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1981), pp. 494515. [5] See (1) Cooper, R.V.L., Military Manpower and the All-Volunteer
Force (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1977), pp. 223250;
(2) Fredland, J.E. and Little, R.D., Socioeconomic Characteristics
of the All Volunteer Force: Evidence from the National Longitudinal
Survey, 1979 (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Academy, 1982); (3) Fernandez,
R.L., Social Representation in the U.S. Military (Washington, DC:
Congressional Budget Office, October 1989). [6] See Population Representation in the Military Services, Fiscal
Years 19911997. [7] Aspin, L., Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services, The
All Volunteer Force: Assessing Fairness and Facing the Future,
before the Association of the U. S. Army, Crystal City, VA, April
26, 1991. [8] Aspin, L., All Volunteer: A Fair System, A Quality Force (Washington,
DC: Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services, April 26, 1991). |
||||||||||||||||||
|
|||||||||||||||||||
back | next | ||||||||||||||||||